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Over the past several decades, the global rise
in atmospheric carbon and changes to the
climate have meant continuing challenges to
Mainers’ way of life. Experts predict elevated
temperatures and increased precipitation and
freeze-thaw cycles will necessitate more
frequent repairs to Maine’s roads, culverts,
and bridges. Such incidents could burden
state agencies and place additional strain on
Maine’s economy.
As climate awareness continues to grow, many
states are taking matters into their own hands.
In 2005, a collection of states established the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) to
curb emissions in the power sector. Using
RGGI as a springboard, the Transportation and
Climate Initiative (TCI) was formed five years
later to mitigate emissions in the transportation sector. In Maine, the transportation sector
is responsible for 53% of the state’s carbon
dioxide emissions, making it an important
target for emission reductions.
With the release of the final MOU, the basic
structure of the TCI (now called the
Transportation and Climate Initiative Program,
or “TCI-P”) was solidified. Just four of 14 eligible
jurisdictions signed the MOU, with eight
states now participating in policy development. Two states, New Hampshire and
Maine, have opted out of formal participation
in the TCI-P citing concerns that projected
increases in the price of fuel would disproportionately affect rural citizens. A map of the
TCI-P region is shown in figure 1.

Figure 1: Map of the TCI-P Region

Note: this map was created with permission from
mapchart.net.

This policy brief is a summary of our research
examining the differential effects of the TCI-P
on rural and urban households in Maine. The
highlights of this research are presented here,
with special attention given to changes in fuel
consumption and CO2 emission reductions as
well as the equity implications of the TCI-P.
The most visible effect of the TCI-P is the
expected economic burden of $52 to $92 per
year for the average Maine household. Our
findings are summarized below:
h To determine households’ responses to
predicted fuel price increases of 5¢ to
9¢, we adapted short-run estimates of the
price elasticity of demand for gasoline in
Maine, finding a statewide (weighted) estimate of -0.8737. Estimates for rural and

h

h

h

h

h

urban Maine were -0.9747 and -0.7473,
respectively. We performed sensitivity
analyses using elasticities 50% lower and
25% higher than these estimates.
Statewide adapted price elasticity estimates show an average Maine household
would reduce its consumption of gasoline
by 1.8% to 3.3% in the short run
depending on the change to the price of
gasoline. Sensitivity analysis showed a
maximum range of +/- 1.6 percentage
points.
Results showed a decline of 1.8% to 3.3%
in metric tons of CO2 from household
gasoline emissions depending on the
change to the price of gasoline. Sensitivity
analysis showed a maximum range of +/1.6% of total household vehicle emissions.
Findings indicated the TCI-P could result
in some disparities in economic losses
and burdens for rural households as
compared to urban households.
Depending on the change in the price of
gasoline, rural households could face
annual economic losses of $1 to $4 and
economic burdens of $52 to $92. Urban
households could face annual economic
losses of $1 to $3 and economic burdens
of $52 to $92. Sensitivity analysis showed
a maximum range of economic losses and
burdens of +/- $2. The similar range of
values suggests that price elasticity is less
important than households’ quantity
demanded of gasoline in determining
economic loss and burden. On average,
we found rural households consume 18
more gallons per year as compared to
urban households.
Disparities between rural and urban
households are driven, in part, by differences in median household income. The
median average income for rural households is $53,701 compared to $60,571 for
urban households. Households were classified as rural or urban based on county
residence.
Results indicated Maine may face annual
losses in gasoline tax revenue of $3.24
million to $5.84 million depending on the
change in the price of gasoline. These

figures represent short-run losses from
changes in household consumption of
gasoline only. Sensitivity analysis revealed
a range of revenue losses 50% lower to
25% higher.
Revenues from allowance auction proceeds
could generate $32.44 million ($32.29 to
$32.74 million after sensitivity analysis) annually in the short-run given a 5¢ increase in the
price of gasoline. Given a 9¢ increase, we estimated $31.95 million in auction revenues
annually in the short-run ($31.68 million to
$32.50 million after sensitivity analysis). These
values assume a starting allowance price of
$6.60 and represent revenues generated from
household gasoline consumption only.
Efforts to achieve the goals laid out in Maine’s
Four-year Plan for Climate Action may
require decision-makers to discuss how the
TCI-P fits alongside state objectives. The
present research can help inform this
discussion.

Overview of the TCI-P
The TCI-P is a cap-and-invest program facilitated by the Georgetown Climate Center,
aiming to reduce emissions in the transportation sector by 26% by 2032.1 As a cap-and-invest program, the TCI-P sets a maximum
quantity of emissions (in MTCO2) and auctions
off a limited number of allowances (to be
determined in the final Model Rule) to state
fuel suppliers. Fuel suppliers are then required
to hold one allowance per MTCO2 contained
in affected fuel, which includes any retail gasoline and on-road diesel sold in a participating
TCI-P jurisdiction.
When fuel suppliers purchase allowances, it is
assumed they will try to pass all costs onto
consumers, such that the price per gallon of
gasoline will rise. Whether or not the full price
of allowances is passed on depends on the
demand and supply for gasoline and diesel.
Recent estimates predicted a 5¢ to 9¢ increase
in the cost per gallon of gasoline in 2023,
assuming an allowance price of $6.60. These
2

has made various recommendations to guide
investment decisions. Based on these recommendations, participating jurisdictions could
invest in things like vehicle electrification,
public transit, or constructing active mobility
infrastructure (e.g., bike paths).

“What is ‘cap-and-invest?’”
Cap-and-invest is a term used for cap-andtrade programs like RGGI where the
proceeds are dedicated towards actions to
reduce carbon emissions. In its most basic
form, cap-and-trade entails selling a limited
number of carbon credits to polluters who
may either use them to cover their own
emissions or sell them to others.

The way auction proceeds are invested will
determine the kind and extent of expected
program benefits. For example, investments that prioritize active mobility infrastructure would result in greater health
benefits from reduced air pollution, while
investments prioritizing vehicle electrification would result in greater reductions in
greenhouse gas emissions.

forecasts are estimates; prices could be higher
or lower depending on the demand for
gasoline.
Given the potential for price variability, policy
designers incorporated various price stabilization mechanisms to help ensure price increases
remain within the 5¢ to 9¢ range. Two such
mechanisms are emissions containment
reserves (ECRs) and cost containment reserves
(CCRs). These mechanisms moderate price
fluctuations by removing (in the case of the
ECR) or introducing (in the case of the CCR)
allowances at the appropriate time.

Apart from health benefits, a recent
report from the Georgetown Climate
Center estimated that the TCI-P could
result in a regional $590 million annual
increase in GDP and 2,660 new jobs per
year, assuming at least 13 eligible jurisdictions participate.2
Greater participation in the TCI-P region
would lead to greater benefits.

Prices are further stabilized by multi-year
compliance periods, which provide fuel
suppliers additional time to meet allowance
obligations given year-to-year variation in
gasoline demand. Allowance banking and
offsets also help to stabilize prices, and each
are permitted under the draft Model Rule so
long as certain requirements are met.

Equity Implications
The TCI-P may impact some Mainers more
than others. In an interview from December
2020, Governor Mills noted her concern
that increases in the price of gasoline
would fall harder on low-income residents.
Trucking and logging companies in Maine
have raised similar concerns for their own
industries.

Investments & Benefits
When jurisdictions auction off allowances to
fuel suppliers, this generates revenue that can
be invested to meet TCI-P goals. These goals
include reducing CO2 emissions in the transportation sector, reducing particulate matter
and other air pollutants, promoting economic
growth (e.g., through job creation), and making
clean transportation more accessible, among
others.

Equity concerns such as these are not
unique to Maine. In fact, the focus on
equity has led to efforts on behalf of TCI-P
policy designers to mitigate unbalanced
impacts. The MOU, for example, requires
that 35% of TCI-P revenues be dedicated
to “overburdened and underserved”
communities. It also contains a provision
for an Equity Advisory Body to provide

While jurisdictions can allocate TCI-P proceeds
as they see fit, the Georgetown Climate Center
3

input and oversight on TCI-P policies,
including on how revenues are invested.

of the price elasticity of demand for gasoline.
The Georgetown Climate Center provided estimates of the fuel price increases expected to
result from the TCI-P. We also collected data
from Google Maps, the Bureau of Motor
Vehicles, the Maine Department of
Transportation, and the American Automobile
Association for similar purposes. The
Transportation Energy Data Book from Oak
Ridge National Laboratory provided additional
information needed to convert gasoline
consumption into CO2 emissions.

Study Purpose and Scope
The purpose of this study was to determine
the economic effects of the TCI-P on Maine
households. This involved estimating multiple
factors, including:
1. The short-run, household price elasticity of demand for gasoline in rural
and urban Maine
2. The expected change in gasoline
consumption from the TCI-P
3. The change in CO2 emissions associated with expected changes in gasoline consumption
4. The economic loss and burden from
expected reductions in household
gasoline consumption
5. The change in tax revenues resulting
from reductions in household gasoline
consumption
6. The net revenue gain (after-tax) from
allowance auction proceeds

Price Elasticity
The price elasticity of demand is a measure of
one’s sensitivity to changes in the price of a
good or service. In relation to the TCI-P, price
elasticity represents the degree of responsiveness in the quantity demanded of gasoline
expected to result from a 5¢ to 9¢ increase in
the price of gasoline.
Since the present research sought to determine the differential effects of the TCI-P on
rural and urban households, a separate price
elasticity estimate was required for both
regions. To determine these respective elasticities, we adapted estimates from Spiller,
Stephens, and Chen (2017), who divided
households’ price elasticity into eight different
characteristics, including:

Important to note is that we studied the TCI-P’s
impact on household gasoline consumption
only. We did not study the economy-wide
impacts of the TCI-P, nor did we study the
effects of the TCI-P on diesel consumption.
Similarly, we did not analyze the reductions in
CO2 emissions, economic losses and burdens,
tax revenues, and allowance auction proceeds
associated with diesel consumption.3

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Results
Data
We collected data from the Maine Department
of Environmental Protection (MeDEP), the
American Community Surveys (ACSs), and the
Georgetown Climate Center. The MeDEP
supplied data on 2017 fuel consumption by
vehicle type, which was instrumental in estimating reductions in the household consumption of gasoline. The ACSs provided the
demographic data needed to adapt estimates

Household size
Vehicles per household
Vehicle fuel economy
Distance to the nearest metropolitan
statistical area (MSA)
Gasoline price
Average commute time
Income
Region (rural or urban)

Estimates are shown in abbreviated form in
table 1 and in full in the appendix.
Perhaps the most common way to estimate
the price elasticity of fuel demand is through
the use of reduced-form models. These estimates have typically generated short-run (1-5
years) elasticities ranging from -0.2 to -0.3.
4

Table 1: Elasticities by region
Rural

Urban

Statewide

-0.975

-0.747

-0.874

Given a 5¢ price increase, we estimated that
consumption of gasoline would decline by
19.46 million gallons (35 gal/household), or
165,565 MTCO2 and a 3.3% reduction in household vehicle emissions from gasoline.
Sensitivity analysis revealed declines in gasoline consumption ranging from 9.73 million to
24.33 million gallons in the short-run, or
roughly 17 to 44 gal/household, respectively.
This corresponds to emission reductions of
82,782 MTCO2 (1.7%) to 206,956 MTCO2 (4.1%).
Results are summarized in table 2.

Note: Adapted estimates of the price elasticity of demand for
gasoline represent short-run (1-5 years) sensitivity in household consumption to changes in the price of gasoline. Elasticities reflect a gasoline price of $2.39.

Note that the estimates used in the present
research are higher (more elastic) in absolute
value.
There are several reasons for this, one being
that the study on which the present research
was based used household-level data. Studies
using household-level data tend to produce
higher elasticity estimates,4 typically ranging
from -0.43 to -0.67.

Economic burden is defined as the direct
change in consumer wellbeing from an
increase in price.
Economic loss is defined as the indirect
change in consumer wellbeing from a
reduction in market activity that households value.

To check the validity of results, we conducted
an asymmetric sensitivity analysis using elasticities 50% lower and 25% higher than those
given in table 1. These results are reported in
the following subsections.

Economic Loss & Burden
We estimated economic loss and burden for
both rural and urban households to determine the potential for heterogeneous impacts
across different sections of the Maine population. Economic loss represents the decline in
consumer wellbeing when price increases
cause households to purchase less gasoline
than they otherwise would. Economic burden
represents the decline in consumer wellbeing
when households spend more per unit of
gasoline. Economic loss and burden are illustrated in figure 2 below.

Gasoline & Emission Reductions
We estimated the change in households’ quantity demanded of gasoline using the statewide
elasticity estimate of -0.874 given above,
assuming either a 5¢ or 9¢ increase in price.
Estimating these factors was an important
step toward determining the broader effects
of the TCI-P in Maine, discussed below.
Given a 5¢ price increase, we estimated gasoline consumption would decline by 10.79
million gallons (19 gal/household) in the
short-run. Multiplied by an emission factor of
0.008507 MTCO2/gal of gasoline,5 this equals
91,778 MTCO2, or a 1.8% decline in household
vehicle emissions from gasoline. We obtained
a range of possible gasoline and emission
reductions through sensitivity analysis, which
showed gasoline could decline by 5.39 million
to 13.49 million gallons, or roughly 10 to 24
gal/household, respectively. This corresponds
to emission reductions of 45,889 MTCO2 (0.9%)
to 114,723 MTCO2 (2.3%).

Results indicate little variation in either
economic loss or burden for rural and urban
households given the range of price elasticities
we considered. We estimated that a 5¢ increase
in the price of gasoline would lead rural
households to face economic losses of just
over $1 per year, while urban households
would face losses of just under $1 per year.
The economic burden for rural households
was also comparable to that of urban households, with both facing burdens of roughly $52
5

Table 2: Gasoline and Emission Reductions
Price
Change

Change in
Consumption
(millions of gallons)

5¢
9¢

10.79 million
19.46 million

Change in
Emissions.
(MTCO2)
91,764
165,552

% Change in
Emissions

% Range in
Emissions

1.8%
3.3%

0.9% to 2.3%
1.7% to 4.1%

Note: The first column shows two potential price increases that could result from the TCI-P. Given these price increases, the subsequent columns show a range of expected gasoline and emission reduction outcomes. The final column provides a percentage
range of emission reductions (and therefore a range in consumption) using elasticities 50% lower and 25% higher than those
given in table 1.

Figure 2: Economic Loss and Burden

		

a.

b.

Note: When fuel suppliers purchase allowances to cover the emissions of affected fuel, it is assumed they will attempt to pass costs
onto households. The supply curve therefore shifts up by amount t, in proportion to the cost of allowances. As graphs a. and b.
show, these efforts are only partially successful, as households respond by reducing their quantity demanded of gasoline. The result
is a price increase of (Pt – P) instead of the full amount t. Thus, the cost of allowances is shared by both fuel suppliers and households, with households facing 5¢ to 9¢ increases in the price of gasoline in the case of the TCI-P. Note also that the demand curve
is depicted as being concave to the origin. This is true only if households become more price elastic as prices rise, as suggested in
Spiller, Stephens, and Chen (2017).
The upper bound of the economic (or “deadweight”) loss faced by households is shown by the yellow-shaded region in panel a. Economic loss represents the costs associated with a reduction in market activity when the cost of gasoline rises by amount (Pt – P). The
upper bound of the economic loss is calculated following Spiller, Stephens, and Chen (2017) for small, incremental changes in the
price of gasoline, as would be expected from the TCI-P. The economic burden faced by households is shown by the yellow-shaded
region in panel b. The economic burden represents the share of household expenditures on fuel that result from an increase in the
price of gasoline. It is considered a more direct measure of consumer welfare than economic loss.
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per year (approximately 2.1% of annual fuel
costs and 0.6% of average costs of driving for
households from either region). Given a 9¢
increase in the price of gasoline, we estimated
rural households would face economic losses
of under $4 per year, while urban households
would face losses of under $3 per year. We
found that the economic burden for rural
households to be just over $92 per year in the
short-run, and for urban households, just
under $92 per year. These figures for the
economic burden represent 3.6% of fuel costs
and just over 1.0% of the total costs of driving
for the average Maine household from either
rural or urban Maine.

3. Our analysis found rural households
consume 18 gallons more per year as
compared to urban households.
See “Study Limitations” for more information.

State Tax Revenue
The gasoline tax in Maine is 30¢ per gallon,
plus an additional .01¢ per gallon in fees.6 If
households reduce their quantities demanded
of gasoline in response to price increases,
state tax revenues will fall proportionately.
We found that a 5¢ increase in the price of
gasoline would result in losses of $3.24 million.
A 9¢ increase would result in losses of $5.84
million.

Sensitivity analysis revealed little deviation
from these results. Given a 5¢ price increase,
economic loss ranged from 54¢ to just over $1
per year for rural households and 40¢ to just
over $1 per year for urban households.
Economic burden for a 5¢ price increase
ranged from $52 to $53 per year for rural
households and from $51 to $52 per year for
urban households.

Sensitivity analysis found that a 5¢ increase in
the price of gasoline could result in losses of
$1.62 million to $4.05 million and that a 9¢
increase could result in losses ranging from
$2.92 million to $7.30 million.

Allowance Auction Proceeds

Given a 9¢ price increase, sensitivity analysis
showed economic losses ranging from $2 to
$4 per year for rural households and from $1
to $3 per year for urban households. Analysis
showed that economic burdens given a 9¢
price increase could range from $91 to $94 per
year for rural households and from $91 to $93
per year for urban households. As a percent of
households’ fuel and total driving costs, sensitivity analysis revealed no meaningful deviation from initial results given a 9¢ price
increase.

The effects of tax revenue reductions on the
Maine economy may be contrasted with
auction proceeds generated by the TCI-P.7 We
estimated the portion of proceeds expected
from household consumption of gasoline in
Maine.
In a recent report from the Georgetown
Climate Center, allowances for the TCI-P were
predicted to start at $6.60 per MTCO2 in 2023.
Given this price, we found that the TCI-P could
raise $31.95 million to $32.44 million annually
depending on the change in the price of gasoline in the state.

Results for economic loss and burden are
similar for three reasons:

Given a 5¢ increase in the price of gasoline,
sensitivity analysis revealed that the TCI-P
could generate auction proceeds of $32.29
million to $32.74 million. A 9¢ increase in price
would result in a lower stream of proceeds
due to households’ higher elasticities and
lower consumption of gasoline. This is an
unexpected result arising from our high elasticity estimates. Sensitivity analysis showed

1. The price change expected from the
TCI-P is relatively small.
2. While elasticity estimates differed
substantially between rural and urban
Maine, in this case we found elasticity
plays a lesser role in determining
economic loss and burden than
households’ quantity demanded of
gasoline.
7

auction proceeds could range from $31.68
million to $32.50 million given a 9¢ price
increase.

However, expanding public transit may not be
cost-effective in some of the most rural parts
of the state. This solution may also fail to
address the unequal burden rural businesses
(particularly within the logging and trucking
industries) would face from the TCI-P. While
TCI-P proceeds may be used to fund rebate
programs for more fuel-efficient trucks, these
rebates may still prove insufficient for those
businesses operating on the smallest margins.
In such contexts, alternative solutions may be
necessary to ensure the TCI-P does not create
disproportionate impacts. Future research
should investigate the viability of the following
policy proposals as potential supplements to
existing transportation goals:

Responding to Equity Concerns
The TCI-P addresses important questions
about how to cut greenhouse gas emissions in
one of the most polluting sectors in the
economy. However, it raises equally important
questions about how to best serve the overburdened and underserved members of our
communities. Responding to these questions
can be challenging.
The 35% equity mandate mentioned above is
one response that seeks to find middle ground
between both issues. Yet questions remain as
to how exactly this portion of auction proceeds
should be spent.

1. A portion of TCI-P proceeds could
be redistributed in the form of an
annual tax credit to households that
meet specific criteria: e.g., income,
commute distance, household size.

One way to guide investments of TCI-P
proceeds would be to follow the transportation goals already laid out in Maine’s Four-year
Plan for Climate Action—some of which may
effectively address equity concerns. Increasing
the fuel economy of Maine’s vehicle fleet, for
example, would ensure that those who drive
the most (rural households) would receive the
preponderance of benefits, in this case through
reduced expenditures on gasoline. Providing
rebates for used and new high efficiency vehicles would be one way to facilitate this solution, as the Maine Climate Council
recommended.

2. A portion of TCI-P proceeds could
be set aside to pay for tax breaks
for industries disproportionately
affected by the TCI-P, such as the
logging and trucking industries in
Maine.
3. A portion of TCI-P proceeds could
fund the implementation of fuelsaving technologies or other strategies utilized by the Environmental
Protection Agency’s SmartWay
program.

Expanding access to public transit is another
goal listed in Maine’s Four-year Plan for Climate
Action, with even greater potential to address
equity concerns. A recent paper from
Gillingham and Munk-Nielsen (2019) found
that, in settings where access to public transit
is universal, a gas tax with a uniform redistribution of revenues given to each member of
society is progressive in terms of vertical
equity. This novel finding suggests a positive
relationship between the accessibility of public
transit and the progressivity of a program like
the TCI-P.

Conclusions
Considerations for Policymakers
In addition to equity concerns, several other
considerations may guide policymakers’ decision whether or not to join the TCI-P in the
future:

8

h The TCI-P will contribute modestly to the
state’s mandated emission reduction
goals of 45% by 2030 and 80% by 2050.
h Relatedly, the TCI-P could serve as a
funding source to help Maine meet the
transportation goals outlined in the Fouryear Plan for Climate Action.8 There is
currently an annual $232 million shortfall
in funding for transportation-related projects, and funding needs will only increase
as the state moves to meet these goals.
h Policymakers may consider how a patchwork TCI-P could impact program effectiveness. For example, if Maine decides to
join the TCI-P but New Hampshire,
Vermont, or other states do not, some
households and interstate truckers
could choose to fill up outside state
borders to avoid price increases. The
average price of motor fuel in New
Hampshire is somewhat lower than it is
in Maine (approximately 9¢ more per
gallon). For truckers or households living
on or near the New Hampshire border,
this discrepancy may prove sufficient to
alter consumption behavior. On the other
hand, residents living on or near the
Canadian border would continue
purchasing their gasoline in Maine, as gas
prices in the two bordering provinces of
Quebec and New Brunswick are, based on
current provincial averages, at least 33%
higher.

h Maine trails a majority of states in gas tax
rates and is ranked 27th nationally.
Highlighting this point may soften remonstrances over gas price increases.
h Policymakers should transparently state
the benefits and costs to be expected by
both rural and urban households, as well
as their plans to distribute them.
h While communicating about the TCI-P,
policymakers should: (1) emphasize the
contemporary relevance of climate
change, (2) appeal to social norms, and
(3) suggest simple actions that are implementable in everyday life.
The transportation sector remains a significant source of greenhouse gas emissions in
Maine. While the TCI-P may contribute to the
state’s transportation goals, its success or
failure will largely depend on how policymakers address Mainers’ concerns about
equity. Doing so will require care and ingenuity to develop the right policy solutions, the
right messages, and the right communication
strategies.

Responding to Public Opinion
Public opinion polling from Climate Nexus
and the Yale Program on Climate Change
Communication (YPCCC) reported that 56% of
Maine survey respondents expressed at least
some support for the TCI-P, compared with
26% that expressed at least some opposition.9
Majority support may provide additional justification to adopt the TCI-P. Still, policymakers
must take care in responding to the public’s
concerns. Utilizing the following messaging
and communication strategies may help policymakers increase public support for the
TCI-P:

9

APPENDIX: Short-run Weighted Elasticities by
Household Characteristic
Maine Average Elasticity Estimate
Category

Maine Average

Weights

Household size

2.33

9.5%

-0.77030

Vehicles per household

2.06

13.5%

-0.84710

Average MPG

21.76

13.5%

-0.89745

59.99 km

9.5%

-1.61901

2.39

13.5%

-0.60031

Average commute

24 min.

13.5%

-0.87400

Household income

$55,425

13.5%

-0.72557

Both

13.5%

-0.84622

100.00%

-0.87372

Distance to MSA
Gasoline price

Rural or urban?
Weighted average

ŋ

Maine Rural Elasticity Estimate
Category

Rural Average

Weights

Household size

2.32

9.50%

-0.76920

Vehicles per household

2.06

13.50%

-0.84710

Average MPG

21.76

13.50%

-0.89745

80.97 km

9.50%

-2.50770

$2.39

13.50%

-0.60031

Average commute

24.73 min.

13.50%

-0.87984

Household income

$53,700.96

13.50%

-0.71109

Rural

13.50%

-0.97800

100.00%

-0.97467

Distance to MSA
Gasoline price

Rural or urban?
Weighted average

ŋ

Maine Urban Elasticity Estimate
Category

Urban average

Weights

ŋ

Household size

2.35

9.50%

-0.77250

Vehicles per household

2.06

13.50%

-0.84710

Average MPG

21.76

13.50%

-0.89745

30.16 km

9.50%

-0.50500

$2.39

13.50%

-0.60031

Average commute

22.96 min.

13.50%

-0.86568

Household income

$60,571.24

13.50%

-0 .76716

Urban

13.50%

-0.65900

100.00%

-0.74732

Distance to MSA
Gasoline price

Rural or urban?
Weighted average
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Methods
Methods centered around in two main areas: (1) creating a classification scheme for rural and
urban households and (2) adapting short-run estimates of rural and urban households’ price
elasticity of demand for gasoline.
The rural/urban classification schemed was based largely on definitions from the U.S. Census
Bureau, which considers an “urbanized area” to contain 50,000 or more people. In the present
research, Maine’s three Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) (Bangor, Portland-South Portland,
and Lewiston-Auburn) were used as proxies for Maine’s urbanized areas, which are identical
excepting the cities of South Portland and Auburn. Specifically, households located within counties containing the principal cities of each MSA were considered “urban,” whereas households
located outside these counties were considered “rural.” As such, Androscoggin, Cumberland, and
Penobscot counties were all classified as “urban,” while Aroostook, Franklin, Hancock, Kennebec,
Knox, Lincoln, Oxford, Piscataquis, Sagadahoc, Somerset, Waldo, Washington, and York counties
were classified as “rural.” See the sidebar titled “Study Limitations” for a discussion of how this
classification scheme impacted study results.
As described above, estimates of the price elasticity of demand for gasoline were modified
according to eight different household characteristics, including:
h Household Size. Household size for rural and urban Maine was determined by summing the
weighted average household sizes in each county according to their rural and urban designation. Counties were weighted according to their relative share of the rural or urban
population.
h Vehicles Per Household (VPHs). The VPHs characteristic was calculated by dividing the number
of registered household vehicles by the number of households in Maine.
h Average Fuel Economy (MPG). MPG was calculated in several steps. First, an average vehicle
miles traveled (VMTs) estimate from the Maine Department of Transportation was multiplied by the number of licensed drivers to estimate total annual VMTs in Maine. This value
was then divided by the total number of gallons of motor fuel consumed by Maine households in 2017 (including gasoline and diesel).
h Distance to the Nearest MSA. Distance to the nearest MSA for rural and urban Maine was
calculated by summing the weighted distances (in kilometers) from the center of population
of each county to the closest MSA. Distance was weighted according to each county’s relative share of the rural or urban population.
h Gasoline Price. Gasoline price information was obtained from the American Automobile
Association.
h Commute Distance. Household commute distance for rural and urban Maine was obtained
at the county level from the American Community Survey 5-year estimates from 2014-2018
and was weighted according to county population.
h Median Household Income. Median household income for rural and urban Maine was calculated in the same way as the “commute distance” characteristic.
h Rural Versus Urban. The classification scheme used to discriminate between rural and urban
Maine is described above.
A more thorough elucidation of research methods can be found in the original study, published
here.
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Study Limitations
Several limitations impact the findings of this study. The first is the lack of ideal data for the estimation of three household-specific characteristics (vehicles per household, MPG, and town-specific gasoline prices) for rural and urban Maine. We used statewide averages instead, as shown
in the appendix.
Another limitation is a lack of definitive guidance on the relative importance of household characteristics in determining a household’s sensitivity to changes in the price of gasoline. However,
as sensitivity results show, this is not likely to have an important impact on our equity
calculations.
A final limitation is the method we used to differentiate between rural and urban households.
This method resulted in less variability in individual households’ quantity demanded of gasoline
than may exist in practice, considering the potential for underlying variability in household
behavior. Our method of classifying households, while useful for highlighting differential effects,
tends to underestimate the economic impacts of the TCI-P on rural households that drive long
distances.
To illustrate, we calculated the economic burden for households that consume 25% more and
25% less gasoline than the average Maine household. The average household consumed 1,057
gallons of gasoline in 2017. Using the statewide elasticity estimate of -0.8737, we found that
households who consume 25% more gasoline (1321 gal/yr.) would face a short-run, annual
economic burden of $65 to $115 depending on a 5¢ or 9¢ increase in the price of gasoline,
respectively. Households who consume 25% less gasoline (793 gal/yr.) would face an economic
burden of $39 to $69 depending on a 5¢ or 9¢ price increase, respectively.
We believe, and the numbers confirm, that a household’s burden from the TCI-P will be driven
mainly by its VMTs, not its degree of sensitivity to changes in the price of gasoline.
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Endnotes
1 Recent modeling results predict that emissions in the transportation sector will decline by 24.3% whether states
join the TCI-P or not.
2 At the time, North Carolina was not eligible to participate. These figures therefore assume participation of
Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, Delaware,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia.
3 The reason for excluding economy-wide effects of the TCI-P should be clear from the study purpose given
above. Excluding the effects associated with diesel consumption was deliberate and motivated by the fact that
diesel comprises just 2.1% of households’ consumption of motor fuel in Maine. Calculating the effects associated
with diesel consumption would have also required a customizable estimate of the price elasticity of demand for
diesel fuel at the household level, information that was unavailable at the time of this study.
4 This claim is based on research from Graham and Glaister (2002), as cited by Spiller, Stephens, and Chen (2017).
5 The emission factor used in this study was calculated by multiplying the amount of carbon in a gallon of E10
(2,347 grams) by the ratio of molecular weights for carbon and CO2 (44/12). This number was then divided by
1,000,000 so that it could be expressed in metric tons.
6 The 30¢ gas tax can be found in 36 M.R.S. §2903(1) (2019). The .01¢ fee can be found in 38 M.R.S. §551(4A-1)
(2015).
7 It is important to note restrictions on TCI-P revenue allocation will likely preclude replacing losses to the General
Highway Fund arising from decreased gasoline tax revenues.
8 While the TCI-P would generate revenues for clean transportation-related projects, policymakers should weigh
these revenues against so-called “leaky bucket” costs associated with revenue transfers. These costs include
things like the distortionary effects of taxes (to the extent that the TCI-P functions as a tax) and the administrative costs associated with the distribution of benefits.
9 Margin of error = +/- 6-9%.
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